Illegal to punish or punish the illegals: Which way should Ukraine and Moldova choose? by Lundgren, Ted
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Illegal to punish or punish the illegals:
Which way should Ukraine and Moldova
choose?
Ted Lundgren
Universitatea de stat din Moldova
1. June 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31851/
MPRA Paper No. 31851, posted 28. June 2011 13:29 UTC

ILLEGAL TO PUNISH OR PUNISH THE ILLEGALS - WHICH WAY
SHOULD UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA CHOOSE?
[51 rl. Young Moldovan migrants make use of these smugglers . il1cg~lIy 
crossing the Slolak border from the Ukrainian town of Stryi [3 16]. 
In tile West. there is an ongoing debate on v... hether legislation against illegal 
immigr<ltion is working or not. There is also a discussion on whether policies of 
punishment can be seen as etllically jnst The current ,iew adopted by most 
recwing countries is that the illegill nligrant should be considered as innocent, 
o r e\'en ilS i! victim. The nligrant onlY wilnts to come and \york in order to 
sUrYlve, and to support himself and his fanlily back home [6:4) The people 
smuggler, or facilitator, on the other hand is someone \\ho should be brought to 
justice since he is taking ildvantage of a person in desperate need, and is making 
money from breaking the law [ibid) . In most of today 's deyeloped nations, a 
common policy is to deport the illegal nligrant but to ptmish thc facilitator, 
sometimes giving tJle latter a jail sentence. In other ccuntrics. s~ch as Malaysia, 
an illegal imnligmnt can face a fine of $2,600. iI mandatory jail term of five years 
and si .\ lashes with a rattan cane [4168-1691. In l\larch 2(1()2. Malaysia issued an 
amnesty which lilsted until August 2002 . in order to ghc illegal ilTunigrants iI 
chance to leave the country without fear of pLUllshment. 318.272 illegal 
imnligrants left tile country [ibid] . Thus, there might be some e\ idence thilt harsh 
punishments . directed not only against facilitators but also against illegal 
inunigrants, are working. So what policy of punishment should countries like 
Ukr3ine alld Moldova choose? Who should be punished and who should not? 
Generally : How should European gOH:rrunents allocate resources for 
inunigration bet\\een competing ends? An economist such ilS Gary Becker has 
recently mglled that Western goverrunents currently have only two options. They 
must either open up their borders and start allQ\ying illegal immigrants or they 
must beg in to punish the latter as well , preferably witlljail[2]. 
Objectives 
In t!lis imicle J take on ~ neoclassical , Beckerian approach [I) of indil'idll~ls 
who can choose bc ~\ ccn earning an honest income and beconwlg iJlcgalh in tlie 
migration 111<lrket. In il ge neral model , I study the conditions of a rational sche ilic 
under which potclltiill migrJnts, faciliUltors and a government are maximising 
their utililies. The market form resembles perfect competition as there are manl 
billers ( llli gmlHs) and sellers (facilitators) . The sellers (facilitators) ca.n for 
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example be freelancers who live i.n some border area in the \Vcstem Newly 
Independent States - WNlS - such as the CmpallliallS in Ukraine, who know the 
terrain and who are willing to take migrants across tlle Schemer border for a 
predefined sum of money The aim of the article is to deriYe tlle conditions under 
\vhich migrants. irllermediaries and governments ma\imise their utilities, find a 
solution, and give a hint at what a choice of punisluncnt policies could look like 
for host countries. The act of illegnUy crossing a state border and the 
consequences tJlereof is described as a von NeLUnann-Morgenstern lottery . 
The Model 
We consider the case where there is a large number of facilitators (F) 
working on a freelance basis in some given border area . Migrants (:\1) ",-'anting to 
cross the border illeg!JJly do not face any particular difficulty finding a filcilitator. 
TIle market structure somewhat resembles perfect competition. We assume that 
the facilitator has linlited influence over the price and tJlill he cares about llis 
reputation (R) 
From the potential migrant ' s point of view. tllere are il limited nLUnber of 
choices, given in the decision tree ill fig L The migr:1nt can choose io lUre the 
services of a facilitator. If he does, then there is a probabiJity PI that the 
facilitator is honest and will , to the best of his ability and after having received a 
fixed sum of money from the migrant. fulfill his obligillions and take him across 
the border. There is a probability I-P) that the facilitator is e\ploitative In that 
case, he will simply take the migrant's money and "dump him in the forest " 
before having crossed the border. If lhe facilitator is honest , then there is a 
probability P2 that the border crossing will be successful and il probability I-P 
2 
that the party IS caught. Likewise, all other options that the pOlCntiill nligrant has. 
and their associated probabilities. are given in the tree 
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2, - the maximum possible Slim for the migT<lnt. 

Let us indicate the cost of each branch of the tree fo r the migrant and for the 

facilita tor, going from up to dOI\"n 
Probability 
1'(1 ) 
11 I' pel) =p . Pi .p, .p, 
P(2) =pH . p':' . ( I _ p, ) p,c .Q, 
P(3) =p H. p;,.I. p, .(1 - p,)p~ 'Q, 
P(4) =pH. p,U 'p, ' (1- p,)p~ 'Q , 
peS) = p" .p;"' . p, '(i - P,JP; Q. 
P(6 ) =,," .pt'· p, .(\- p,)p;Q, 
P(7) =pH. Pi' p, (1- p,)p~ .Q. 
P(8) = p' .P:' . p , (1- p,)p; 2,0, 
j.(,)) =,, ' .pt' · p,( I- p,)pi(!·;), 
P(I O) = ,,' . p," . p, ·(1- P:)P; ' (J,(J, 
P( l l) = p" . P:' . p, ·(1- p, )p; .Q,Q, 
P(l2) = p ' . p;" ,p, (I- p,)p; 'Q,Q, 
P(l3)=p· .p;" ' p, ' (1 - p,)p; Q,Qo 
P(l4) = p H . p ,M . p , (,1- p,)p ;: .9,9, 
P(15) = p" .p;" .p, (I - p, )p; Q,Q, 
P(1 6) = p H. p;" .p, ·(1- p, )p~Q,Q. 
P( 17 ) = pH p;" ( 1 - p,)r 
P(IS ) = pH pj" ( I- p,)(1-r) 
P(19) =pH .p;" . P, 
P(20) = pH . p;" ·(1- P, )p~Q, 
P(21) = pH . p;" .(1- p)p~Q, 
P (22) = pH . p;" . (1- p.,) p~Q) 
P(23) = p . p;". p, ' p, 
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Migrant Facilitator 
cel) F(J ) 
Z' 
- z;- ·c Z{ 
k· i ,- X; 
- £ 
Z' 
-Z; - C - TZH Z'L 
7.{ - C 
-Z~ - C- p" £ 
k· 7." -Z; 
kZc-7! X; - C- R- P. 
k i f/ -I{ Z; - C -R- TZF 
- , Z,' - C -R 
- - / ' -( ' :t; -C~ R -P, 
- /! -c i ; -C -R-TZ, 
- Z;' -(" - PI( ' - C -R 
.- !. t -C -1~\J Z: - C - R - PF 
7:- .. C - Pe z; - C-II -T Zr 
-Z,' - c -r· Ze Z ~ - C-R 
-z; -C-TZH Z{-C -R- PF 
- Z; - C- TZN 7.{ -C -R-TZ , 
- Z; I; - R 
- Z; ZF £ 
okill -Ct ·Z. 
- aZH - C o 
o
-aZk - C- p U 
o-Ct.Z4 -C - TZ~ 
k?H - fJl.{ (3 ..,::" 
f ' ,2-l) = p" . p~. p, .(1 - p, )p;c .Q, 
P(25) = ,:. ,,;'p,O - I', )p,' .Q, 
P(2G) =,,' . p;". p, ·(1- p, )p;Q, 
P(27) = ,: .p;'f . p, (1 - p,)Pi.Q, 
P(28) = / .p;" p , (1- p,)Pi. .Q, 
P(29) =p·.";4 . P, .(\ - p,)p~ 'Q. 
P(30) = p . . p;" . p, .(1- p, )p~ .Q,Q, 
P(3 1) = p H p:' P, (1 - p, )p~ .Q,Q, 
P(32) =p" .p';' . PI . (1-p, )pfQ,Q. 
P(33) =,,". Pi" · p,(\- p,)p'j .Q.:Q" 
1'(34) =p" . p~ . p,(I - p,)p;Q.Q, 
1'(.1';) =p H. p;" . p, .(1 - p,)p~ 'Q,Q. 
1'(36) = p o' . pt' · p, .(1- p ,)p; 'Q,QJ 
P07) =P -. . Pi" p, ' (I - p,)p~ .Q,Q, 
l'! . ~8) = p" . P:' p , ' (1- p ,)p; 'Q,Q. 
1'(77) =pH P:" 
PUR) = pi p;" 
The probabilities P(39) - P(76) 
substituting p L for p H and ZL for 
ciln be wrinen as 
-jJZ{-C Ii 7.: 
- (ll.:~ - C - P" jJ ZL 
-fjZ{ - C - T ZH jJ zt 
k·ZH-jJ·L: (l zt -c 
k,ZH -/3 ·Z: fi i: - C -R - Py 
k,ZH -jJ Z{ /3 l { - C - R-T Z, 
- /3Z{-C jJ 7.; -C-R 
- fj Z[ - C /3 Z: - c - R - PI 
- fi'Z{ - C jJzt - C-R - T ZF 
-jJ·Z[ - C-PM P Z; - C - R 
- jJZ: - c - P", $1.; - C - R - p.. 
-fJZ ;-C -P., fJZ : - C - R- rZ, 
- j3Z[ - C- TZ H PZ; -C - R 
- fiZt -C -T 'I.{f f/7. t -(' R P, 
- /3Z r-C- T Z H N: -C - H Tl. , 
ZH 0 
ZL 0 
are obtained from 1'(1) - P(38) by 
ZH . The expected utilit), of the migrant 
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E[C.": (Z ;) ] = L,P(i)UM (Z41(i ) +C(i)) , 
i=1 
where ZM (i) = ZH for i = 1, ... ,38, and ZM (I) = ZL for i =39,, 76 
The expected utility of the facilitator is 
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E [Ur(Z{) ] =LP(i)Ur(Zr +F(/) 
1=1 
All \ 'a Jues in the slims could be taken from the tab le . We co me li p Ilith the 
problem 
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2 
m E [UM(Z; )]+f ' E[U« Z r) J -4 ~~X (I) 
under constraints Os2; sZ, (2) 
The optimisation problem 0-2) could be solved by taking the derivative of 
(1) and put it equal to zero. The solution would appear either in the critical point 
or in the end points. Taking the derivative of the left side of (I) wc get the ftrSt 
order condition 
IS 38 X, 
-mLP(i)U ;,(ZH +C(i» - m · jJ. LP(i)U".t CZ II +C(l l) - 11/ L P(I )C \{ (7., ... C(i ))­
1"'1 '... 23 , - )9 
-rrl ' fJ " LP(i)u;" cz L +C(i» + 
(3 ) 
i .• 61 
18 3S ~ :l 
+fLP(t'YJ~(I, +F(i»+ f ·jJLP(i'jj~ (ZF +F(I»"'.lI: P(I )/. ' ,(7. " F(i» 
bd /=:23 ! ' ,.I 
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+jJ f LP(i)U~ ( Zf + F (i» ; 0 
1= 6 1 
Comparing the values ofthc utilit\ function I II ( I) in thc cnd points with the 
value in the critical point we obtain the solulion "f ( l-~) 7 :" . This is an optimal 
solution for illegal migrants and facilitators . 
We now introduce the govenunelll of tilc ilost COUIllj'\ into the model. The 
government faces the problem of allocating scarce resources bcm'cen competing 
ends. We assume that the aim of the government is to minimize the maximum 
expected utility of the migrant and the facilitator. The gO"cffiment has to do this 
with respect to a fixed budget and a set of specified constrdints For example, 
though it might be desirable for the goverrunent to punish both the facilitator and 
the illegal migrant with jail, thereby causing the highcst possible negati"e utility , 
building prisons and detention centres, and keeping people in them is costly . 
The government must also act with respect to human rights and immigraJlt lobby 
groups in order not to lose votes . 
To keep it simple, let the government tend to minimi:ce the function 
E[UM(Z{") ] +E[uI (Z r ) ] ~ ,vL' L( - f'w -PF' -(), 
,,,here y is the weight of the lobby utility [unction CL t - PM ' - PF , -T) . 
The constraints are the foUowing : 
pln."S PM S P'nla." Pl nu"s l ~ s l' l ",~" rcrrins Tsrm~" 
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Let the utility fllllctiolls of the migrant and facilitator be as follows 
2x X'[ i 
M 
(x) = x --2o, .. x 5 b , UF(x)=x - -,xs b, ' 2b_ 
where x s: hi for the migrant and x :S: b2 for the faci! itator. We assume that 
,alues b , and b2are sufficiently large and that (ZH+ C(i)) :s: b" (ZL+F(i)) ~ b
II the utility functions are quadratic then equation (3 ) takes the [orm 
lR ]8 
-mLP(i)(-I- CZH -C (i)-I{) / 6, )-mjJ . LP(I)(-l-(ZH - C U) -' fJZ; ) / q )­
I~I ~D 
-mfp(I )( -I - CZL - C (I)- Z{) l b,» ­
h J9 
" 
-m fJ L l'(i)( - 1- (I L -C (i) - /J/.{)I b, »+ 
1= 6 1 

18 38 

+fLP(i)( I -.(7. , 1-F (i) +l{) ' b, »+ ffJLP(I )(l - CZ , +F-(l)+ fJ I { ) /6, )+ 
H'1 ;=13 
50 ,., 76 
+fLP(l)U~ CZ ; + FUl) + f· jJ . LP(i)(l- (Z" + r ei) + fJ I{ ) I b, ) ; 0 
i -N 1- 61 
where C (I) =C (I) + Z; , r (I) =F(i) - Z; . 
Collecting the tcnns with Z{ and without Z{ we have 
11 )I .16 
[(-"'L,"(/) q )-'/1J Ii' L I1"I) ' !.J )-mLP(/)'4»)­
• • ;_t l I 
-m{r" ±i1:') ~ -/r.P(I).b,-f/f r.P(/) I b, -ft,P(/) ' b, 
·41 ,·1 "':0 I..;f) 
-If · tf·,,\1) l ) ~ m±A:/X"'I- (Z" -C'(1)) .' 4 )+m. {3. i:P(IX-J-(z" - C'(i) / 4)+mI:P(IX-t-(Z, - C' (I») ' 11))+ 
,,",,I 01 -­
+m./I. t ,R:X-i- (Z -C' (I » ; ~ »)-!±P(iXI - (Z, +F(I» / h,»- F pr,P(/Xl-(Z, + P-(/») f lj )­
,·°1 ,"I , .. D 
..t,P(/Xl - iL , t!·" (I) h, l- P / i:P(IXl- (Z, +F(i) f G )= 0 
:,."R .<41 
Let 
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